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A hotly debated issue in the market microstructure literature is the effectiveness of call 
auctions as against continuous trading systems.  In this paper we investigate this issue by 
studying the impact of the suspension of opening and closing call auctions by the National 
Stock Exchange of India in 1999.  We compare the volatility, efficiency and liquidity (VEL) 
of securities in the market before and after suspension, and estimate the value of the auctions 
to traders by carrying out an event study.  Contrary to expectation, we find that VEL factors 
improved following the suspension, and the CARs were significant but were not uniformly 
positive or negative.  As a partial explanation for these results, we find that less liquid stocks 
traded less in the auctions than did other securities, especially at the opening, and they 
experienced the most gains following the suspension.  This suggests that less liquid stocks did 
not gain the expected benefits from the auctions, and therefore that it cannot be assumed that 
a call auction system will improve share trading in a less liquid emerging market.  Future 
research in this area will need to pay attention to the composition of the shares being traded 
and to the nature of the trading process in different shares in the market. 
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1.   Introduction 
Two of the most important topics in market microstructure are the design of trading protocols 
and the evaluation of their effectiveness.  Since trading protocols provide the framework 
within which markets operate they play a central role in price formation and discovery 
(Madhavan, 2000).  Evaluating the effectiveness of different protocols is therefore a key 
concern for market authorities and regulators.  One of the most hotly debated issues in this 
area is the effectiveness of call auctions as against continuous trading systems.  In theory, call 
auctions provide an efficient mechanism for aggregating diverse information because trading 
does not take place until price discovery has occurred (Economides and Schwartz, 1995), 
whereas under continuous trading, price discovery and trading take place simultaneously 
implying that trades may occur at “false” prices (Schwartz, 2000).  Conversely, it can be 
argued that continuous trading is preferable to call auctions because the former involves 
greater immediacy and therefore less price risk.  In an auction, there is a delay in establishing 
the trading price, and so the “true” price may change between the submission and execution 
of an order (Madhavan, 1992). 
So far, the balance of empirical evidence comparing call auctions and continuous trading is 
inconclusive.  Ellul, Shin and Tonks (2003) found that price discovery at the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) tended to be higher during call auctions than within the dealer market 
transactions taking place concurrently off the exchange.  In contrast, Amihud, Mendelson and 
Lauterbach (1997) document large increases in asset values on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange 
for stocks which moved from a daily call auction to more continuous trading, implying that 
investors valued continuous trading more highly.  We review related research in section 2 of 
the paper.  Meanwhile, there are several possible reasons for this mixed evidence.  First, call 
auctions vary in structure and different call auction structures may have different effects.  
Second, different markets have a range of different trading protocols, and it may be that 
similarly-structured auctions have different effects in a different market context.  Kairys, 
Kruza and Kumpins (2000b) point out that different exchanges adopt different listing 
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requirements, price limits, and minimum tick sizes, all of which may affect the workings of an 
auction.  Third, comparisons between call auctions and continuous trading will be difficult 
because the two systems being compared rarely share a common set of trading protocols 
(Madhavan, 2000).  For example, much of the evidence on the effectiveness of call auctions is 
gleaned from markets where auctions are used to begin or end trading, but Amihud, 
Mendelson and Murgia (1990) show that, in Milan, there was little to choose in terms of 
efficiency as between continuous trading and call auctions which were not h e l d  a t  t h e  
beginning of the day.  Many studies look at the impact of the replacement of call auctions by 
continuous trading on an exchange (Amihud et. al. 1997), but such changes typically involve 
other reforms to the trading system making it difficult to conclude if costs or benefits are due 
to the switch to continuous trading or to other factors.  
A further limitation of the existing empirical literature on call auctions is that it is mostly 
concerned with the stock markets of the major industrial countries.  Exceptionally, Shastri, 
Shastri and Sirodom (1995) investigated the impact of the opening call auction on the 
Bangkok stock exchange, and found that prices at the opening call were more volatile than 
during the rest of the day.  This could be because uncertainty and therefore volatility are at 
their maximum early in the day following the overnight closing rather than because of 
deficiencies in the call auction system per se, and this tends to be supported by the results of 
Amihud et. al. (1990).  In general though, there has been very little comparable research on 
stock exchanges in emerging markets.  This is an important omission because a central 
characteristic of most emerging stock markets is that they are less liquid than the major 
industrial countries, and it has been argued that call auctions are particularly suited for trading 
less liquid stocks (Madhavan, 1992).  This suggests that in emerging markets call auctions 
may have advantages over continuous trading systems in fostering the efficient trading of 
relatively illiquid securities.  However, this argument also underlines a further difficulty in 
comparing call auctions and continuous trading: if the effectiveness of an auction depends on 
the thinness of the market, a proper comparison must control for variations in market thinness, 
and possibly other factors. 
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In this paper we adopt a novel approach to the call-auction/continuous-trading debate.  We 
investigate the impact of the suspension of opening and closing call auctions by the National 
Stock Exchange of India (NSE) on the 9th June 1999
1.  As far as we are aware, this is the first 
study of the impact of a suspension rather than a comprehensive permanent change in trading 
arrangements.  The suspension of the auctions was part of a series of experiments by the NSE 
which had as its ultimate objective the establishment of call auctions alongside continuous 
trading arrangements.  An important aspect of this event is that other market protocols and 
arrangements were not changed at the suspension.  This makes for a relatively clean 
comparison between the two systems.  Furthermore, continuous trading was in effect before 
and after the suspension.  Therefore the call auctions did not limit immediacy in the market 
given that stocks still traded continuously for most of the day.  We are not therefore 
comparing two systems with a range of different trading protocols.  Moreover, the NSE is an 
emerging market and includes a significant proportion of less liquid securities.  This enables 
us to investigate any differences in the effect of the suspension as between more and less 
liquid securities in the market. 
Our paper has two main objectives.  The first is to estimate the impact of the suspension of 
the call auctions at the NSE and therefore to infer the contribution of the auctions to the 
organisation of market activity.  We do this by comparing the volatility, efficiency and 
liquidity (VEL) of traded securities in the market before and after suspension.  The second 
objective is to estimate the value of the call auctions to traders.  This we do by means of an 
event study. 
Under the circumstances of the NSE, auctions might be considered as value-increasing by 
market participants, and therefore their suspension as value-decreasing, given that they should 
help in the price discovery process without preventing continuous trading for most of the 
trading day.
2  Pagano and Schwartz (2003) found that the introduction of a closing call 
auction at the Paris Bourse created improvements in the price discovery process, without any 
                                                 
1  The NSE circular announcing this change was issued on the same day. 
2  Upon the suspension of the call auction on NSE, the time devoted to continuous trading was unchanged.   
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negative effects during the continuous trading session.  If our expectations are correct, 
following suspension, we should observe higher excess volatility, a reduction in open and 
close price efficiency, and perhaps lower liquidity.  In addition, following the argument that 
call auctions are particularly suited for trading less liquid stocks, we should observe that the 
less liquid stocks in the sample experience a more severe deterioration in these factors as 
compared to the other ones.  In fact, the results of the comparison analysis and of the event 
study are not in line with our expectations.  We therefore conducted further tests to examine 
the relationships between the response to the auction suspension and the composition of the 
sample securities, particularly in respect of their initial betas and liquidity.  It turns out that 
the latter variable is a relevant factor in explaining the results which we obtain. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  In section 2 we review relevant theoretical and 
empirical literature concentrating on comparisons between call auctions and continuous 
trading.  Section 3 sets out some background material on the NSE and describes the data used 
in this study.  In section 4, we investigate the impact of the suspension of call auctions on 
volatility, efficiency and liquidity.  Two different tests are undertaken for assessing the 
changes for each of these factors.  It turns out that these tests point to a significant overall 
improvement in VEL factors, contrary to what might be expected.  The event study is 
discussed in secion 5 and the CARs, though significant, exhibit a different pattern from that 
which would be expected following the results of the changes in VEL factors.  Therefore, we 
undertake further tests to check if these results can be explained by the composition of the 
sampled stocks.  A concluding discussion and evaluation is given in section 6. 
2.   Research  Background 
The central issue in the debate between call auctions and continuous trading is the trade-off 
between information efficiency and immediacy.  A sequence of call auctions aggregates 
information more efficiently, especially where asymmetric information is a particular problem 
and dealers are reluctant to take the opposite side of trades.  However, periodic auctions lack 
continuity and therefore reduce the immediacy of trading.  They may also result in higher 
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information costs given that current prices are available less frequently (Madhavan, 1992).  
However, these arguments are less relevant where call auctions are used solely at the opening 
or closing, since trading still occurs continuously for the rest of the day.  Moreover, lack of 
immediacy is an issue in any setting in which trades cluster to one specific point or short 
period, and this may occur independently of an auction.  Admati and Pfeliderer (1988) give a 
theoretical example in which uninformed traders choose to transact in the lowest cost period.  
Similarly, traders who submit orders prior to the market opening have to wait for execution 
until the opening.  Thus, it can be argued that an opeing call auction. such as we analyse for 
the NSE, is unlikely to have an effect on immediacy, as compared with continuous trading 
(Vayanos, 1999). 
Thus, theory would suggest that an opening call auction will bring improved pricing 
efficiency with little loss of immediacy as compared with continuous trading.  Several 
researchers have investigated the properties of opening call auctions.  In a study of the pre-
open call auction of the (former) Paris Bourse, Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1999) identified a 
clear price discovery process as orders posted successively later during the call contained 
increasing amounts of information about the true price, while those posted early could be 
classified as noise.  Evidence against the pricing efficiency of an opening call auction was 
reported by Amihud and Mendelson (1987) who compared the opening call auction with the 
continuous trading session on the NYSE.  They found that opening returns exhibited greater 
dispersion, higher negative autocorrelation and a larger residual error component than closing 
returns.  Similarly, Shastri, Shastri and Sirodom (1995) found that opening prices on the 
Thailand Stock Exchange, which are determined through a call auction, tended to be more 
volatile than those of the rest of the day.  However, since uncertainty is typically at its peak 
during the opening of a trading session, these results may emanate from the initial uncertainty, 
rather than any inherent inefficiency of auctions, and this argument is supported by the results 
of Amihud, et. al. (1990) and Amihud and Mendelson (1991), who analysed call auctions 
which were not held at the start of the trading day and found that the auctions were no less 
efficient than continuous trading. 
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In general, the relative efficiency of call auctions depends on the trading structure with which 
they are compared.  In a study of the NASDAQ, Angel and Wu (2001) suggest that a dealer 
market may be better equipped than call auctions to handle the random nature of order 
imbalances, although they themselves advocate a hybrid trading mechanism incorporating the 
best features of call auctions and dealer markets.  Furthermore, Ellul, Shin and Tonks (2003), 
found that price discovery tended to be higher during the LSE call auctions as compared to 
the contemporaneous dealership market transactions taking place off the exchange.  Call 
auctions should increase liquidity and reduce trading costs by batching transactions which 
might have otherwise been executed sequentially (Economides and Schwartz, 1995).  Kehr, 
Krahnen and Theissen (2001) examined the difference in trading costs between call auctions 
and continuous trading sessions on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange.  They found that auctions 
provided transaction cost savings for small transactions, but not for large transactions.   
Similarly, Ellul, Shin and Tonks (2003) found that small orders were cheaper to execute in the 
call auction, but larger orders tended to be cheaper to execute in the dealership market. 
The issue of whether call auctions constitute a better trading method for less liquid stocks has 
also been debated.  It can be argued that less liquid stocks are subject to a greater degree of 
asymmetric information (Barry and Brown, 1984), implying that call auctions are especially 
suitable for trading such stocks.  Comerton-Forde (1999) compared trading on the Australian 
Stock Exchange which commences with a call auction, with that on the Jakarta Exchange 
which commences with continuous trading.  He concluded that the auction increased liquidity 
and reduced volatility in the initial phases of the trading sessions, particularly for less liquid 
stocks.  However, Ellul, Shin and Tonks (2003) found that on the LSE, where trading at the 
opening and at the closing may take place both through call auctions and the dealership 
system, less liquid stocks tended to trade in the dealer market more frequently, even if the call 
auctions offered cost savings and higher pricing efficiency.  One possible explanation for this 
behaviour is that dealers invariably guarantee the availability of a counterparty whereas call 
auctions depend to a higher degree on co-existing public orders.  
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Studies of changes in trading systems on a particular exchange generally find that a switch 
from call auction to continuous trading increases stock values.  See for example Muscarella 
and Piwowar (2001) for the former Paris Bourse; and Amihud et. al. (1997) and Lauterbach 
and Ungar (1997), for Tel Aviv.  An event study on its own is a relatively blunt instrument, 
and these results do not necessarily imply that call auctions are inherently inferior trading 
systems.  Kalay, Wei and Wohl (2002) argued that such results may simply reflect investors’ 
preferences for stocks that trade continuously rather than stocks that trade at auction, although 
it is likely that causation could be two-way, ie: investor preferencees may also be influenced 
by the systems by which different stocks are traded. 
The changes in VEL factors of stocks when the latter switch from call auctions to continuous 
trading might also depend on the initial liquidity levels of the stocks.  For instance, Kairys, 
Kruza, and Kumpins (2000a) found that when the Riga Stock Exchange shifted from a call 
auction to a continuous trading system the overall liquidity impact was positive, yet the 
benefits accrued to stocks which were already liquid whilst the volumes of smaller company 
stocks declined. 
3.    Data and Notation 
The National Stock Exchange of India (NSE) was established in 1994 and is one of two major 
Indian exchanges, together with the Bombay (Mumbai) Stock Exchange (BSE). During 2000, 
around 1,300 equities traded on NSE, through 960 brokerage firms
3.  Most major stocks are 
quoted on both NSE and BSE and these exchanges compete both for listings and order flow.  
During the period covered by this paper the volume of a typical trading day on the NSE was 
around 400,000 transactions. 
The NSE was set up with on-line, continuous, screen-based, nationwide electronic trading.  
Subsequently, the exchange introduced as an experiment a pre-opening and post-closing call 
auction.  This followed the basic rule that the resulting price should maximise the total traded 
 
3  Shah and Sivakumar (2000). 
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quantity, implying that the gap between demand and supply should be ideally zero.  Orders 
which included bargain conditions such as “All-Or-None” were not considered in the 
auctions.  Orders could also be modified and cancelled during the sessions.  Market buy (sell) 
orders were considered as orders which were prepared to trade at the highest (lowest) 
available price; they therefore obtained the best price priority and were listed at the top of the 
order book in the auction sessions.  For the rest of the trading day the system continued to 
function as a continuous pure limit order book market, with time and price priorities applied 
to incoming orders.  There are no market-makers on the NSE, and therefore theories which 
suggest that market-makers are a factor in determining the relative efficiency of continuous 
trading versus call auctions (Ellul, Shin and Tonks, 2003) are not relevant to this study. 
In the period when auctions were in effect, the pre-opening auction was usually held between 
09:30 and 09:45, followed by continuous trading until 15:30, and subsequently by a post-
closing auction between 15:30 and 15:45.  As from 9th June 1999, the initial and closing 
auctions were suspended.  From this date, continuous trading took place between 10:00 and 
15:30.  Our data period runs from March 2
nd through September 4
th 1999, or for 63 days either 
side of June 9
th when the auctions were suspended
4. 
The NSE offers particular advantages for a study of this kind.  First, about 1,100 equities are 
traded enabling the selection of a large sample of liquid and less liquid stocks for analysis.  
Second, trading volumes are high for the most liquid stocks, but there is a range of trading 
volumes, even among the more liquid stocks, and this enables an analysis of the relationships 
between liquidity and trading protocols. 
The data was extracted from the NSE’s historical trades data CDs
5.  These include data on the 
volume and price of all trades carried out on the exchange on a trade-by-trade basis.  In 
selecting the securities to be included in the sample, only equity issues were considered.  We 
aimed to select the most liquid stocks, in order to obtain sufficient observations for analysis.  
 
4  Our sample period is characterized by occasional minor changes in trading hours 
5  We thank the NSE for providing us with trial copies of these data. 
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We therefore selected 170 stocks with the highest quantities traded, and a further 170 stocks 
with the highest Indian Rupee value traded.  We combined these samples, deleted the 107 
stocks which were duplicated and a further 51 stocks which had missing observations or 
changes in equity structure (mergers, new share issues or stock splits).  The final sample thus 
consisted of 182 of these more liquid stocks.  However, it should be emphasized that this 
sample does include a wide range of liquidity.  We only excluded stocks where trading was 
sufficiently thin so that there was no trading at all in at least one day of the sample. 
Transactions occur at random times and this results in irregular sampling intervals.  For the 
purposes of this study, the data interval was homogenised by using daily observations on 
prices and volume.  For prices, we used the daily last trade prices for each stock, unless 
otherwise specified.  Table 1 shows a summary of the data periods used for the comparison 
analysis and event study. 
___________________________________________________________________________  
Table 1 and 2 about here 
___________________________________________________________________________  
To get a preliminary idea of activity in the auctions prior to suspension, we selected three 
trading days at random from different days of the week and reasonably close to the event date.  
We split the sample into high, medium and less liquid stocks and calculated some summary 
statistics of trading activity (table 2).  As we would expect, trading frequencies increase as we 
move from the low to medium and to high liquidity stocks.  Furthermore, the level of activity 
is generally higher for the closing auction than for the opening auction.  One possible 
explanation for this is that any unexecuted orders at the end of the continuous session are 
automatically carried forward to the closing call, whereas this does not happen in case of the 
opening auctions, as unexecuted orders are often cancelled at the end of the trading day.  This 
might suggest that the closing auction contributed more to trading than did the opening 
auction, notwithstanding the argument noted in section 2 that an opening auction brings 
improved efficiency with little loss of immediacy as compared with continuous trading. 
  9©  Silvio John Camilleri and Christopher J. Green, 2004 
  All Rights Reserved 
 
4.    The Impact of Auction Suspension on Volatility, Efficiency and Liquidity 
4.1   Volatility 
The impact of the suspension of the call auctions on market volatility is assessed through a 
comparison of the scaled intra-day price difference and reversals of overnight returns, for the 
pre-event and post-event data.  These measures focus on short-term volatility, given that any 
expected impacts of call auctions on price stability are essentially of a short-term nature. 
The scaled intra-day price difference is an indicator of intra-day volatility and is given by: 
Di,t = (Phigh i,t – Plow i,t ) / Popen i,t                ( 1 )  
where Phigh i,t , Plow i,t and Popen i,t are the highest, lowest and opening prices for security i on 
day t respectively.  Contrary to expectations, intra-day volatility decreased in the post-event 
period, and the hypothesis of no difference between the pre-event and post event Di,t is clearly 
rejected (table 3).  We also tested the difference between the standard deviations of Di,t for 
each stock but no significant change in this statistic is evident. 
___________________________________________________________________________  
Table 3 about here 
___________________________________________________________________________  
We next consider overnight return reversals which are a measure of inter-day volatility, ie. 
that between trading days.  If the opening and closing auctions help in price discovery, we 
would expect lower overnight volatility during the period when auctions were held.   
However, a direct comparison between overnight returns in the pre-event and post-event 
periods is potentially misleading as higher price changes in one period might be justified by 
the news in that period.  Thus we concentrate on the reversal of price movements.  If price 
movements overnight and during the subsequent day are driven independently by the news in 
each respective period then we would expect there to be no systematic relation between 
overnight and next-day returns.  If however, overnight price movements are systematically 
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reversed next day, this implies that the overnight movement was excessive and provides 




t i t i
o
i i t i r r , , , ε π µ + + =                    ( 2 )  
A significant negative πi provides evidence of price reversals during the day and therefore of 
excess volatility between the previous closing and subsequent opening.  We do not test for 
longer-horizon reversals because we expect the main effect of call auctions to be on short-
term volatility. 
From table 3, we see that the mean of the slope coefficient (π) is negative in both the pre-
event and post-event period.  However, the t-test shows that there was a highly significant 
increase in │π│ following suspension of the auctions implying, on this measure, an increase 
in volatility as we would expect. 
We checked that there were no additional events which might have impacted on volatility 
during this period by reviewing relevant NSE circulars.  The only possible event was that on 
June 16
th the National Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCC) applied additional volatility 
margins in respect of outstanding positions of trading members in highly volatile stocks.  This 
might have discouraged trading members from taking or increasing positions in volatile 
stocks, and if anything might be expected to reduce volatility as between the pre-event and 
post-event period.  Furthermore only four of the affected stocks are included in our sample, 
indicating that the additional volatility margins were unlikely to have affected our results. 
4.2   Pricing Efficiency 
Two different tests of pricing efficiency are conducted: Relative Return Dispersion (RRD) 
and the Serial Correlation of Returns.  RRD is calculated by averaging the squared residuals 










ε                     ( 3 )  
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where, RRDt is Relative Return Dispersion across the sampled securities during time t, εit are 
the residuals from the market model for security i at time t, and n is the number of sampled 
securities.  A lower RRDt indicates a lower pricing error and therefore greater efficiency.  The 
results in table 4 indicate that, in fact, RRDt decreased very significantly suggesting that 
pricing became more efficient following suspension of the auctions. 
___________________________________________________________________________  
Table 4 about here 
___________________________________________________________________________  
Pricing inefficiency can also be measured using the serial correlation of returns for, if prices 
adjust fully to new information, price changes should be uncorrelated provided that the flow 
of news is also an uncorrelated series.  For this purpose, we calculated first-order 
autocorrelation coefficients for each individual stock.  For most stocks the first order 
autocorrelation was insignificant, both in the pre-event and in the post-event estimation, 
suggesting that these stocks were mostly quite efficiently priced.  The correlation coefficient 
does show a significant change as between the pre-event and post-event period (table 4), but 
this is largely due to the fact that the correlations change from being predominantly negative 
to predominantly positive.  We therefore calculated the squared correlation coefficients for 
each firm and found that there was a small increase in pricing efficiency measured by the 
decrease in the squared correlation coefficient but, perhaps not surprisingly, this change was 
not significant.  However, once again the direction of change is unexpected, with the 
suspension of the call auctions being associated with increased efficiency. 
4.3   Liquidity 
Two measures were selected to assess the impact of call auction suspension on market 
liquidity: the number of shares traded and the volume per unit of return.  The number of 
shares traded is a direct measure of volume: higher activity is associated with a more liquid 
market.  According to this measure there was a significant increase in volume following 
suspension (table 5).  Volume per unit of return (the ratio of volume to the absolute return) is 
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an estimate of how many shares traded are associated with a unit share price change.  This 
measure assesses the resiliency aspect of liquidity: how much activity is required to generate a 
unit price change.  The more resilient is the market, the greater is the activity required to 
change the share price in either direction.  We see from table 5 that this statistic also indicates 
a significant increase in market liquidity following the suspension of the call auctions.  Of 
course it is possible that improved resilience may have been partly due to the lower intra-day 
volatility that we identified earlier, but we can still rule out any deterioration in liquidity 
following the suspension. 
___________________________________________________________________________  
Table 5 about here 
___________________________________________________________________________  
5.    The Value of Opening and Closing Auctions to Shareholders 
5.1   Method 
We turn next to an event study to assess the value to shareholders (positive or negative) of the 
suspension of the call auctions.  Event study methods are explained in detail in several places, 
for example by MacKinley (1997).  Here we content ourselves with a brief summary. 
Following Green, Manos, Murinde, and Suppakitjarak (2003), we used the market model 
adjusted for calendar time effects as our model of normal returns:  
t i t m i t i t i r r , , , , ' ' ε β α + + =                    ( 4 )  
where: ri,t is the return of stock i on day t; rm,t is the market return;  t t i t i k r r / ' , , = ;  ; 
k is the return interval in calendar days; α
t t m t m k r r / ' , , =
i and βi are the estimated coefficients; and εi,t is the 
error term.  Although the market model has been criticised in event study applications 
(Coutts, Mills, and Roberts, 1994), the current consensus would appear to be that more 
elaborate methods do not in practise yield significant gains in efficiency or unbiasedness in 
measurement of the abnormal returns which are the key output of an event study.  See, inter 
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alia, Brown and Warner (1980), MacKinlay (1997), and Cable and Holland (1999).  Although 
the stocks in our sample vary considerably in degree of liquidity, we do not have a thin 
trading problem in that all the stocks were traded every day in the sample period.  Therefore, 
no further adjustments were necessary to allow for this. 
Daily abnormal returns for each firm in the event window (ARi,t) are calculated as: 
t t m i i t i t i k r r AR )] ' ˆ ˆ ( ' [ , , , β α + − =                  ( 5 )  










i t i t AR CAR                   ( 6 )  
Finally, the CARs may be averaged across the n firms in the sample to obtain the mean CARs 












                   ( 7 )  
For this study, the event date (t = T) is June 9
th 1999.  Around this, we used an 18 day event 
window; from T–2 to T+15.  The choice of a short pre-event window is suggested by the fact 
that the suspension was not trailed in advance, and that the shorter the event window, in 
general, the more powerful are the tests on the ARs (MacKinley, 1997).  We nevertheless do 
choose a somewhat longer post-event window than might be strictly necessary.  This covers 
the possibility that this market microstructure change might take some time for the markets to 
evaluate, at least in part because it might be interpreted differently by different market 
participants, especially given our evidence reported so far.  Alternatively, some participants 
may classify the change as irrelevant, as it would not be expected to change fundamental 
values of securities in terms of the earnings and risk of the underlying firms. 
Conventionally, the estimation window precedes the event window.  However, this may 
create post-selection bias, if the event is conditional on the characteristics of the securities.  
For instance, Amihud, et. al. (1997) used a post-event estimation window in their study of the 
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impact of a market microstructure reform on selected stocks on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange 
on the basis of their “marketability”.  In the current study, a pre-event estimation window 
covering the period T–62 to T–3 was used as the event under review was not conditional on 
stock characteristics. 
We used as market index the BSE-500, a 500-security index quoted by BSE.  We took the 
view that it was desirable to use a broad-based index and both the key indices quoted on the 
NSE during the sample period comprised just 50 stocks each
6.  We believe that this choice of 
index is reasonable, given that major Indian stocks are quoted on both NSE and BSE, and 
both exchanges are subject to the same systemic risk.  There were five instances when the 
BSE-500 closing price was unavailable, because the BSE was closed.  These trading days 
were omitted from the sample.   
Daily data create a particular set of problems in event studies (Brown and Warner, 1985).  
The main concern for this study is the typical non-normality of daily stock returns which 
creates problems for accurate inferences concerning the ARs, and suggests that we should not 
rely exclusively on standard t-tests.  We pursue this issue in section 5.2 next. 
5.2   Results 
OLS estimates of the market model and relevant diagnostics show that, in general, the model 
performed very well with the standard F test indicating that almost all the regressions have a 
good overall fit (table 6).  The betas are also generally plausible.  There is no serious evidence 
of misspecification or structural breaks in the Reset test, the Predictive Failure test or the 
Chow test.  This is important for our research, given that a frequent criticism of event studies 
is that inferences may be flawed because of time-changing betas.  These tests indicate that 
betas were generally stable over our sample period.  The results of the predictive failure test 
are particularly strong in this respect, given that the 18 out-of sample observations in the 
 
6  The major indices on NSE during the sample period were the NIFTY (NSE-50 Index) and NIFTY Junior 
(Midcap-50 Index).  Nifty was the main index and it included the 50 most liquid stocks which accounted for 
around 50% of the market capitalisation.  Nifty Junior accounted for a further 10% of market capitalisation. 
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event window were used for the test.  It suggests that we can be reasonably confident that the 
model did not change following the event.  The autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity tests do 
not reject the null hypothesis for most stocks.  Moreover, Brown and Warner (1985) argue 
that adjustments for serial correlation in the calculation of test statistics typically bring only 
small improvements in performance. 
___________________________________________________________________________  
Table 6 about here 
___________________________________________________________________________  
The only diagnostic which seems problematic is the normality test where the null of a 
normally distributed error is rejected for 51% of the stocks.  On closer inspection it transpired 
that there were a few abnormally high Jarque-Bera statistics.  For the 6 highest, the fitted 
model mimicked actual market movements reasonably well, except for a few outliers.  Most 
of these were positive suggesting company announcements as a possible cause.  Apart from 
the outliers, most of the residuals were close to zero, and almost uniformly distributed.  This 
suggests that the estimated coefficients will be close to their true values, and the main 
objective in dealing with this non-normality should be to enhance the power of the 
significance tests, rather than obtaining better estimates of the regression coefficients. 
To assess the significance of the ARs, we want to compare the residuals in the market model 
in the estimation period, to the errors obtained when using the model to predict normal returns 
in the event window.  In the absence of normally-distributed errors, we do not rely on 
standard t-ratios.  Instead, we follow MacKinnon (2002) who argues that bootstrap tests 
usually perform better in these circumstances in assessing statistical significance and 
establishing confidence intervals.  The advantage of bootstrapping in the present context is 
that it relies only on the assumption of random sampling from the data at hand, and does not 
require any distributional assumptions. 
Since we are interested in the significance of the ARs rather than their sign, we compare the 
error sum of squares in the estimation period to that in the event window for each stock.  For a 
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valid comparison, we rescale the latter by (60/18) in proportion to the numbers of 
observations in the estimation window and the event window respectively.  Hence, defining 
S.S.R.Ei,est and S.S.R.Ei,event as the Sum of Squared Rescaled Errors for stock i, in the 
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The mean S.S.R.Eest was 0.0787 whilst the mean S.S.R.Eevent was 0.2429; a mean difference of 
0.16419.  To test the significance of this difference, we combined the S.S.R.E.s for all stocks 
in the estimation period and the event period, into a single sample: 364 S.S.R.E.s in all.   
Observations were then randomly drawn without replacement from this population, creating 
two sub-samples, each having 182 observations.  The difference between means of these two 
sub-samples was recorded, and the random drawing repeated 5,000 times
7.  The results are 
summarized in Figure 1 where we see that 0.16419 actually lies outside the bootstrapped 
distribution, implying that we can reject the null hypothesis of equal means at the 99.98% 
level
8 (at least) and conclude that the ARs are highly significant. 
___________________________________________________________________________  
Figures 1, 2, 3 about here 
___________________________________________________________________________  
The cross-section average CARs for all stocks are shown in figure 2.  The sample was then 
randomly split into 5 equal sub-samples
9 and the average CARs recalculated for each sub-
sample (Figure 3).  The plots of the five sub-samples are acceptably similar to the overall 
pattern of figure 2, suggesting that the general behaviour of the CARs is similar across all 
securities: after a short initial increase, the CARs decrease until around T+9; and finally drift 
                                                 
7  The bootstrap routine was obtained from http://www.resample.com/content/about.shtml (accessed 1st March 
2004). 
8  That is: the probability of obtaining the reported mean difference by coincidence is less than 1 in 5000. 
9  Three of the sub-samples consisted of 36 stocks, whilst the other two contained 37 stocks. 
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upwards again.  We conclude that call auction suspension was associated with a significant 
and consistent pattern of CARs.  However, it is not immediately clear how this pattern is 
related to the general improvement in VEL factors following the auction suspension.   
Therefore, in the next section we consider the possible linkages. 
5.3.  CARs and Volatility, Efficiency and Liquidity 
We consider the linkages between the CARs and changes in underlying VEL factors 
associated with the auction suspension by performing two sets of cross-section regressions.  
First, we check if the changes in VEL factors among stocks are related to the betas and 
liquidity levels of these stocks.  Second, we seek to explain directly the cross-sectional 
variation in the CARs by changes in VEL factors, betas and liquidity levels. 
___________________________________________________________________________  
Table 7 about here 
___________________________________________________________________________  
To study the determinants of changes in VEL we regressed 4 of our 6 different VEL factors 
on two sets of dummy variables, the first measuring pre-event risk in three tranches: low, 
medium and high beta stocks; the second measuring pre-event liquidity, again in three 
tranches: low, medium and high liquidity stocks.  Given that our two measures of volatility 
gave different results as to the effect of the auction suspension, both indicators were used as 
regressands.  For efficiency and liquidity, since both measures showed the same qualitative 
effect of the auction suspension, only one of each measure was used as regressand: the change 
in Relative Return Dispersion and the change in the Volume-Return Ratio
10.  We see in table 
7 that all these regressions have low explanatory power and none of the dummy variables are 
significant.  Therefore, the observed VEL changes seem to be unrelated either to the betas or 
liquidity of stocks
11.  This is contrary to the results of Kairys, Kruza, and Kumpins (2000a) 
who found that in Riga, increased liquidity largely accrued to the already most-liquid stocks. 
 
10  These each had a higher significance level in the VEL comparisons than did the alternative measure. 
11  The latter result is thus inconsistent with the findings of Kairys, Kruza, and Kumpins (2000a) cited above, 
who found that increased liquidity largely accrued to the most liquid stocks.  
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___________________________________________________________________________  
Table 8 about here 
___________________________________________________________________________  
We turn next to the regressions explaining the CARs (table 8).  We note that, although the 
CARs are statistically significant, there is a increasing and a decreasing portion, and the mean 
value at the end of the event window is very close to zero (figures 2 and 3).  We therefore 
distinguished between the increasing and decreasing portion of the CARs in the regressions.  
First, the increasing CARs from T+9 through T+15 were regressed on changes in VEL factors 
which showed an improvement, excluding and then including the pre-event beta and liquidity 
dummies as regressors.  Second, the decreasing CARs from t=T through T+8 were regressed 
on the overnight return reversal coefficient (π) which indicated an increase in volatility, again 
excluding and then including the pre-event beta and liquidity dummies. 
For the increasing CARs (Panel A), the Scaled Intra-Day Price Difference is significant but 
with an unexpected sign, Relative Return Dispersion is insignificant and with the expected 
sign, whilst the Volume Return Ratio is significant and with the expected sign.  The beta and 
liquidity dummies are all insignificant, confirming that initial beta and liquidity were not 
relevant in determining the positive aspect of the market response to the suspension.  For the 
decreasing CARs (Panel B), Overnight Return Reversals are positive as expected and 
significant at the 90% level.  The dummy for less liquid stocks is also significant and suggests 
that less liquid stocks experienced higher CARs following abolition of the auctions.   
However, as the dummy for more liquid stocks is also positive but insignificant, we cannot 
conclude that there is a well-defined linear relationship between liquidity and the CARs. 
To check these results we split the whole sample into high, medium and less liquid stocks and 
recalculated the mean CARs (Figure 4).  This confirms that there is indeed a significant 
difference between the CARs of the less liquid stocks (Sample A) and those of medium and 
high liquidity stocks, while the difference between the CARs of medium and high liquidity 
stocks is relatively small.  These results run contrary to the findings of some other researchers 
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that less liquid stocks tend to benefit more from call auctions (Comerton-Forde, 1999; and 
Kairys, Kruza, and Kumpins, 2000a). 
___________________________________________________________________________  
Figure 4 about here 
___________________________________________________________________________  
6.    Further Discussion and Conclusions 
6.1   Some Possible Explanations 
Table 9 summarizes the main findings in terms of changes in VEL factors following the 
suspension of call auctions on the NSE.  The volatility tests present conflicting indications 
but, overall, it seems safe to conclude that the suspension of call auctions was associated with 
an identifiable improvement in market performance.  Why should this be?  We consider 
several possible explanations. 
___________________________________________________________________________  
Table 9 about here 
___________________________________________________________________________  
First, improvements in VEL may have been priced in before t=T, even though the suspension 
was only announced on the event day.  The event window does show small positive CARs in 
days T-2 and T-1.  This may be consistent with insider trading, or that the suspension was 
expected by the market.  The latter is possible because it is generally agreed that the NSE 
suspended the auctions because of problems related to software
12.  However, changes which 
affect the structure of trading can be difficult to price in fully before the event because the 
volume and composition of trading after the event is not known for certain beforehand. 
Second, the finding of a general improvement in VEL following the call auction suspension is 
at odds with the observed pattern of CARs: first decreasing then increasing, and overall 
 
12  We thank Susan Thomas for helpful correspondence on this point. 
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negative for most companies for most of the post-event window.  The cross-section 
regressions provide limited support for the impact of VEL improvements in that the 
increasing part of the CARs are explained to some extent by the positive changes in VEL 
factors, but not all with the expected sign.  One possibility is that the initial downward sloping 
part of the CARs was an over-reaction which was subsequently reversed.  However, it is not 
easy to explain why there should be such an overreaction, especially as this did not occur in 
the less liquid stocks.  Therefore the possibility of an overreaction followed by a correction is 
not really supported by the data. 
Third, the results indicate that intra-day volatility decreased whilst overnight volatility 
increased.  A possible explanation for this is that the opening auctions were not successful in 
reducing intra-day volatility, whilst the closing auctions were contributing towards reducing 
overnight volatility.  This is consistent with the results of Pagano and Schwartz (2003).  There 
was less activity at the opening call auction than the closing call (table 2), particularly for less 
liquid stocks.  Thus, we may hypothesise that whilst closing auctions helped to establish more 
efficient prices and reduce overnight volatility, this was not happening at the opening auctions 
because of insufficient activity, particularly for less liquid stocks. 
Fourth and finally, the results could be related directly to the different liquidity of the shares 
and the performance of the auctions.  The CARs for the less liquid stocks were 
unambiguously positive, whereas the high and medium liquidity stocks exhibited initially 
small positive CARs then larger negative CARs (figure 4).  This is consistent with the 
argument that higher liquidity stocks did benefit from the call auctions but low liquidity 
stocks did not.  This too could be because the less liquid stocks traded much less actively in 
the call auctions and therefore had little to lose from suspension.  However, this hypothesis 
does not explain why the VEL factors all improved following suspension and that there is no 
clear cross-sectional relationship between liquidity and any of the VEL factors. 
None of these explanations is entirely satisfactory, but together, they do suggest that the call 
auctions, especially at the opening were not as effective as might have been expected, 
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particularly for less liquid stocks.  This is consistent with the observation of Schwartz (2000) 
that it is essential that call auctions attract a “critical mass” of order flow, otherwise they may 
fail. 
6.2   Summary of Conclusions 
To our knowledge this is the first study to compare call auctions and continuous trading 
following a suspension, where no other changes in market protocols took place.  It is also 
concerned with an emerging market where low liquidity is more of a potential problem than 
in the major industrial countries.  Our main conclusions from the study can be summarised as 
follows.  First, we confirm the prevailing wisdom that market microstructure changes do have 
measurable and significant effects on stock prices and on the characteristics of market 
performance such as volatility, efficiency and liquidity.  However, contrary to expectations, 
we found that the VEL factors broadly improved following the suspension and the CARs 
were significant but did not exhibit a uniformly positive or negative pattern. 
Second, we cannot accept the hypothesis that the main disadvantage of call auctions is that 
they prohibit stocks from trading continuously for we find evidence that call auctions also had 
a largely negative impact on VEL factors as well as any direct impact on immediacy.  As a 
corollary, it is evident that call auctions do not necessarily lead to an improvement in VEL 
factors as suggested inter alia by Madhavan (1992), for we find the reverse to be true.  
Third, we do not find a clear-cut market reaction to the suspension.  The CARs are significant 
but initially they decrease and then subsequently increase.  The cross-sectional relationships 
between the CARs and the underlying VEL factors are also imprecise.  Stocks which 
experienced the most improvements in efficiency and liquidity also experienced higher CARs, 
although the efficiency effect was not significant.  However, the change in intra-day volatility 
had a positive impact on the cross-section of CARs, but the change in inter-day volatility had 
the expected negative effect. 
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Fourth, we conjecture that a source of these conflicting findings may lie in the liquidity 
composition of the sample securities.  We find that there is a significant difference in the 
response to the auction suspension as between less liquid stocks and medium and highly 
liquid stocks.  Less liquid stocks traded less in the auctions then other securities, especially at 
the opening, and they experience the most gains following the suspension.  The results 
suggest that the less liquid stocks did not gain the expected benefits from the auction system, 
and that the closing auction may have been more effective than the opening.  This could be 
because there exists a liquidity threshold which stocks have to pass to reap the information 
benefits of an auction (Schwartz, 2000).  Given that suspension was related to software 
problems, it could also be that the structure of the auction contributed to the problems 
apparently experienced by less liquid stocks. 
These results have some important general implications.  In particular, the evidence favouring 
continuous trading over call auctions may in part be attributable either to the composition of 
the shares being compared, or more specifically to low call auction activity in the shares, or to 
the timing of the auction(s) during the working day, rather than to a generic flaw in the 
auction process.  This suggests that future research will need to pay more careful attention to 
these issues and delve more deeply into the nature of the trading process in different shares in 
the market. 
Finally, it is important to emphasize that our results do show that it cannot be taken for 
granted that a call auction system will improve share trading in a less liquid emerging market, 
irrespective of whether it is the sole system of trading or operated alongside a continuous 
system.  On the NSE, it appears to have been precisely the less liquid securities which gained 
least from the call auction. 
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Table 1:  Data Periods Used for the Comparison Analysis and Event Study
 
 
Panel A: Pre-Event and post-Event periods used for the comparison analyses
1,2 
  First day  Last day  Number of days in period 
  Event 
Time  Date  Event 



















62 8 70  98 
Post-Event 
period








62 0 62  86 
 
Panel B: Estimation period and event window used for the event study 
Period  First day  Last day  Number of days in period 
  Event 
Time  Date  Event 


















60 8 68  94 
Event 
Window  T-2  7th June 




18 0 18  24 
Notes 
1.  Call auctions were suspended on 9th June 1999.  This date is denoted: t=T.  All other days are 
denoted in relation to this date; for instance T+5 refers to 5 trading days after the event day.  
2.  The comparison analyses include the tests of the differences in volatility, efficiency and liquidity,   
3.  Closed days exclude Weekends 
4.  When working with intra-day prices, rather than returns, one further observation was available and 
therefore data from T-63 until T-1 was used for the pre-event period and data from T+1 till T+63 
was used for the post event period. 
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Table 2:  Summary Statistics for Call Auctions 
 
  Monday 
 3 May 1999 
Thursday 
 27 May 1999 
Friday 
 4 June 1999 
  Open  Close  Open Close Open Close 
Transactions   1,274  2,995  1,446  13,361 3,392  5,642 
Sample A          
Trades (%)   7%  46%  13.6% 88%  18.6%  72.9% 
ATS (Z)  0.4  1.6  0.5  7.8  0.6  10.1 
ATS (NoZ)  5.3  3.4  3.5  8.8  3.3  13.8 
AUT (Z)  49  217  34  1,307  141  830 
AUT  (NoZ) 725 473 254 1,482 755 1,140 
Sample B          
Trades (%)   45%  80%  41%  95%  39.7%  81.3% 
ATS (Z)  2.0  5.0  1.3  21.3  3.1  6.2 
ATS (NoZ)  4.5  6.3  3.2  22.7  8.0  7.6 
AUT  (Z)  447 891 409 5,118 786 1,095 
AUT  (NoZ)  986 1,118  1,005 5,459 2,012 1,348 
Sample C          
Trades (%)   80%  95%  95%  100%  86.4%  98.3% 
ATS (Z)  13.6  28.5  14.7  120.1  42.0  59.9 
ATS (NoZ)  17.1  30.0  15.4  120.1  48.5  60.9 
AUT (Z)  4,290  8,201  4,117  43,515 15,243 19,912
AUT (NoZ)  5,385  8,640  4,338  43,515 17,634 20,255
Notes 
1.  The three days were randomly selected from those that were not more than one and a half months 
distant from the event, and so as to avoid duplication of days of the week. 
2.  Sample A includes 59 sampled stocks with the lowest liquidity levels in terms of pre-event daily 
mean volume.  Sample C includes the 59 stocks with the highest pre-event daily mean volume.  
The remaining 64 stocks were allocated to Sample B as “average liquidity” stocks. 
3.  Transactions = Total Number of Transactions (including unsampled stocks) 
  Trades (%) = % of shares which traded in the auction 
  ATS (Z) = Average no of Transactions per share (incl. zero observations) 
  ATS (NoZ) =Average no of Transactions per share (excl. zero observations) 
  AUT (Z) = Average no of Units Traded per share (incl. zero observations) 
  AUT (NoZ) = Average no of Units Traded per share (excl. zero observations) 
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Table 3:  Volatility Comparisons 
 
Scaled Intra-Day Price Differences  Overnight Return 
Reversals 
Di,t  Std Deviations of Di,t  π 
  Pre-Event   Post-Event   Pre-Event  Post-Event  Pre-Event  Post-Event
Mean  0.0632 0.0564  0.033166  0.033157  -0.3439  -0.3970 
Standard 
Deviation  0.0211 0.0226 0.0165 0.0491 0.1726  0.2288 
t value  7.6443*** 0.0027  2.9097*** 
Notes 
1. D i,t is the scaled intra-day price difference defined for each firm as Di,t = (Phigh i,t – Plow i,t ) / Popen i,t, 
where:  Phigh i,t , Plow i,t and Popen i,t are the highest, lowest and opening prices for security i on day t 
respectively.  
2.  Std. Deviations of Di,t are the standard deviations of each firm’s Di,t in the pre- and post-event 
period. 
3.  π is the estimated coefficient in a regression of the daily return on the previous overnight return: 
, where r t i t i
o
i i t i r r , , , ε π µ + + = i,t is the daily return, and r
O
i,t is the previous overnight return. 
4.  The pre-event statistics were calculated using data from T-63 to T-1, and the post event statistics 
using data from T+1 to T+63.  The mean and standard deviation shown for each variable are the 
cross-section statistics for all firms. 
5.  t value is the t statistic for the null hypothesis of no difference between pre-and post event data.  
These are calculated using the paired means test which provides a firm-by-firm comparison; they 
are not a direct comparison of the means reported in the table. 
  *** significant at 99% level; ** significant at 95% level; * significant at 90% level. 
  90% 95% 99% 
Critical value of t statistic for a two-tail test (n = 182) 1.6533 1.9732 2.6033 
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Table 4:  Efficiency Comparisons 
 
Relative Return Dispersion Serial Correlation of Returns 
RRDt  ρ  ρ
2   
Pre-Event Post-Event  Pre-Event Post-Event Pre-Event  Post-Event
Mean   0.1272  0.1017  -0.0169 0.0791 0.0304 0.0292 
Standard 
Deviation  0.1196  0.1127  0.1739 0.1519 0.0409 0.0352 











ε ; where εit are the residuals from the market model for security i at time t, and n 
is the number of sampled securities. 
2.  ρ is the first-order autocorrelation coefficient calculated for each firm 
3.  ρ
2 is the square of ρ calculated as in note 2. 
4  t value is the t statistic for the null hypothesis of no difference between pre-and post event data.  
These are calculated using the paired means test which provides a firm-by-firm comparison; they 
are not a direct comparison of the means reported in the table. 
  *** significant at 99% level; ** significant at 95% level; * significant at 90% level. 
  90% 95% 99% 
Critical value of t statistic for a two-tail test (n = 182) 1.6533 1.9732 2.6033 
 
 
Table 5:  Liquidity Comparisons 
 
Number of Shares Traded Volume/Return Ratio   
Pre-Event  Post-Event  Pre-Event  Post-Event
Mean   322,391 367,123  108,730  141,148 
Standard Deviation  986,908 942,824  284,978  338,722 
t value  -1.9422* -4.4228*** 
Notes 
1.  Number of shares traded is calculated for each firm in the pre-event and post-event periods. 
2.  Volume/return ratio is the ratio of the number of shares traded in each firm to the daily absolute 
return.  The daily returns include zeroes whereas the volumes do not.  Therefore, we first 
computed daily return/volume ratios for each firm, then calculated the firm means, and finally the 
reciprocals of the means.  This gave (mean) volume/return ratios for each firm in the pre- and 
post-event periods.  The cross-section means and standard deviations of these ratios are reported in 
table 4; and the cross-section t-tests were performed on the volume/return ratios. 
3.  t value is the t statistic for the null hypothesis of no difference between pre-and post event data.  
These are calculated using the paired means test which provides a firm-by-firm comparison; they 
are not a direct comparison of the means reported in the table. 
  *** significant at 99% level; ** significant at 95% level; * significant at 90% level. 
  90% 95% 99% 
Critical value of t statistic for a two-tail test (n = 182) 1.6533 1.9732 2.6033 
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Table 6:  Market Model Estimates 
 
Summary Statistics 
 Mean  Median Standard
Deviation
Min. Max.   
Intercept: αi  0.0008 0.0009 0.0041 -0.0118  0.0168 
t-value: tα  0.1803 0.1958 0.8917 -2.4429  3.3704 
Beta: βi  1.203 1.2231 0.4433  0.1952  2.6905 
t-value: tβ  4.6648 4.7075 1.7018 0.8237  9.0861 
R
2  0.2724 0.2764 0.1324 0.0116  0.5874 
Diagnostics 




F-statistic F (1,58)  24.6409 0.6785 82.5571 4.0000  169  93% 
Autocorrelation: χ
2(1)  2.2013 0.0004 23.3566 3.8410  36  20% 
Reset:  F (1,57)  1.4317 0.0000 21.2354 4.0000  21  12% 
Normality:  χ
2(2)  76.9884 0.0118 6645.50 5.9910  93  51% 
Heteroscedasticity:  χ
2(1)  1.2330 0.0004 36.3735 3.8410  13  7% 
Predictive Failure:  F (18,58)  1.0631 0.1022 10.6618 1.8100  23  13% 
Chow:  F(2,74)  0.9962 0.0040 6.7545 3.1200  13  7% 
Notes 
Summary statistics 
1.  Each column gives respectively the cross-section mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and 
maximum of the firm-specific estimates of the parameters of the market model. 
Diagnostics 
2.  Each column gives respectively, the cross-section mean, minimum and maximum of the 
corresponding diagnostics from the firm-specific estimates of the market model.  “95% CV” is the 
95% critical value of each test; “No. of rejects” shows the number of shares where the null 
hypothesis was rejected at the 95% level indicating a possible misspecification; “% rejects” shows 
the percentage of shares for which the null hypothesis was rejected at the 95% level  
3.  F-statistic:  F test for zero slopes for the regression as a whole. 
4.  Autocorrelation:  LM test for first-order autocorrelation (Breusch and Pagan, 1980). 
5.  Reset:  Ramsey’s test for functional form using squares of the fitted values (Ramsey, 1969). 
6.  Normality:  Jarque and Bera’s (1980) test for normality. 
7.  Heteroscedasticity: LM test for heteroscedasticity (Breusch and Pagan, 1980). 
8.  Predictive Failure:  Chow’s second test for structural breaks (Chow, 1960).  This was applied to 
the 18 observations within the event window. 
9.  Chow:  Standard Chow test for structural break at the mid-point of the estimation window. 
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Figure 1:  Mean Differences for S.S.M.E. 














































































































1.  The histogram shows a summary of the mean differences obtained when the S.S.R.E.s were 
randomly re-sampled 5000 times from the estimation period and the event window combined.   
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Table 7:  Determinants of Changes in Volatility, Efficiency and Liquidity 
 
Beta Regressions  Liquidity Regressions 
Dependent 
Variable  C  βD1  βD2 R
2 C  LD1  LD2  R
2 
-0.11 0.0165  -0.0067 0.0028 -0.1163  0.0421 -0.022  0.026  ∆ SIDPD 
 (t stat)  (5.29)*** (0.48)  (0.24)   (5.73)*** (1.44) (0.75)  
-0.0162 -0.0721 -0.049 0.0129 -0.0427 0.0132 -0.0452  0.0102  ORR 
 (t stat)  (0.52)  (1.40)  (1.19)   (1.39)  (0.30) (1.02)  
-0.1348 0.0929  0.0405 0.0013 -0.1136 0.1559 -0.1067  0.0138  ∆ RRD 
 (t stat)  (1.16)  (0.49)  (0.27)   (1.00)  (0.95) (0.65)  
0.3737 -0.0715  0.2406 0.0158 0.4854 0.2496 -0.295  0.0415  ∆ VRR 
 (t stat)  (2.73)*** (0.32)  (1.33)   (3.65)*** (1.30) (1.54)  
Notes 
1.  ∆ SIDPD is the % change in the Scaled Intra-Day Price Difference as between the pre-event and 
post-event period (table 2). 
2.  ORR is the coefficient (π) from the regressions of the daily return on the previous overnight return 
(table 2). 
3.  ∆ RRD is the % change in the relative return dispersion as between the pre-event and post-event 
period (table 3). 
4.  ∆ VRR is the % change in the Volume-Return ratio as between the pre-event and post-event 
period (table 4). 
5.  βD1 = 1 for stocks with a pre-event β ≤ 0.8; zero otherwise (“low-beta”); 
  βD2 = 1 for stocks with a pre-event β ≥ 1.25; zero otherwise (“high-beta”). 
  The thresholds were set to divide the whole sample into three, approximately equal categories. 
6.  LD1 =1 for stocks with pre-event mean daily volume ≤ 40,000 shares; zero otherwise (“less 
liquid”); 
  LD2 = 1 for stocks with pre-event mean daily volume ≥ 140,000 shares; zero otherwise (“very 
liquid”). 
  The thresholds were set to divide the whole sample into three, approximately equal categories. 
7.  t statistics are shown in parentheses. 
  *** significant at 99% level; ** significant at 95% level; * significant at 90% level. 
  90% 95% 99% 
Critical value of t statistic for a two-tail test (n = 182) 1.645 1.960 2.576 
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Table 8:  Determinants of CARs 
 
Panel A.  Dependent variable:  Mean CARs T+9 through T+15 
C  ∆SIDPD  ∆RRD  ∆VRR  βD1  βD2 LD1 LD2  R
2 
0.048 0.225  -0.001  0.024          0.174
(4.00)*** (3.81)*** (0.10) (3.00)***           
0.057 0.230  -0.001  0.023 -0.031  -0.003     0.184
(3.56)*** (3.90)*** (0.10) (2.88)***  (1.35)  (0.16)       
0.046 0.216  -0.002  0.021      0.025  -0.018  0.194
(2.88)*** (3.66)*** (0.20) (2.63)***      (1.25) (0.90)   
Panel B.  Dependent variable:  Mean CARs T+0 through T+8  
C ORR  βD1  βD2 LD1  LD2     R
2 
-0.039 0.070              0.018
(3.90)*** (1.84)*               
-0.036 0.070  0.000  -0.005          0.019
(2.25)** (1.79)* (0.00) (0.24)           
-0.068 0.063      0.074  0.015      0.081
(4.53)*** (1.70)*      (3.36)***  (0.68)       
Notes 
1.  Panel A: regressors are:  
  ∆SIDPD = % change in Scaled Intra-Day Price Difference; ∆RRD = % change in Relative Return 
Dispersion; ∆VRR = % change in Volume-Return Ratio; βD1, βD2 are the Beta dummy variables 
as in table 6; and LD1, LD2 are the Liquidity dummy variables as in table 6 
2.  Panel B: regressors are: 
  ORR is the coefficient (π) from the regressions of the daily return on the previous overnight 
return; βD1, βD2 are the Beta dummy variables as in table 6; and LD1, LD2 are the Liquidity 
dummy variables as in table 6 
3.  t statistics are shown in parentheses. 
  *** significant at 99% level; ** significant at 95% level; * significant at 90% level. 
  Critical values of the t statistic are: 
 
  90% 95% 99% 
Critical value of t (n = 182)  1.645 1.960 2.576
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1.  Sample A includes 59 sampled stocks with the lowest liquidity levels in terms of pre-event daily 
mean volume.  Sample C includes the 59 stocks with the highest pre-event daily mean volume.  




Table 9: Summary of Changes in VEL Factors Following Call Auction Suspension 
 
Test Outcome 
    In favour of: Significance 
Volatility  Scaled Intra-Day Price Difference suspension Significant  (99%) 
  Overnight Return Reversal  auctions Significant  (99%) 
Efficiency  Relative Return Dispersion  suspension Significant  (99%) 
  Return Serial Correlation  suspension  Insignificant 
Liquidity  Number of Shares Transacted suspension  Significant  (90%) 
  Volume per Unit of Return  suspension  Significant (99%) 
 
 